John v Jane and establishing the truth when every explanation seems improbable

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Family courts are regularly asked to resolve disagreements about children, from where they should live to how much time they spend with each parent. In John v Jane [2026] EWHC 415 (Fam), the High Court faced a far more fundamental question, namely whether the children at the centre of the application existed at all. The applicant sought to establish the whereabouts of two young children he believed he had fathered, and to obtain parental responsibility for them. His former partner, the respondent, maintained that neither child existed, leaving the court to choose between two seemingly improbable explanations. Either she had fabricated both pregnancies and both births over a period of years, or two children had been born and then concealed. The judgment offers a valuable insight into how the family court approaches conflicting evidence, dishonesty and the difficult task of establishing the truth.

Two competing accounts

The applicant’s case rested on what he had been told and what he had seen. He and the respondent met around the start of the Covid pandemic, and their relationship was marked by arguments and, on more than one occasion, police involvement. In late 2022 she told him she was pregnant and sent him an ultrasound image. He gave evidence that she became visibly pregnant and that he had touched her stomach on many occasions. Shortly before the due date in May 2023, the couple argued at her home and she called the police, alleging assault. He was arrested and held on remand for several months, and two days after his arrest she announced the birth of a daughter in a message to his stepfather. On his release the relationship resumed, but she told him the baby was with a family member and that the local authority would not allow him to see her, although she showed him many photographs. A second pregnancy followed. In August 2024, shortly after an argument which ended the relationship, she announced the birth of a son, and soon afterwards reported the applicant to the police for allegedly trying to break into her house. He was arrested again and placed on bail until the charges were dropped in October 2024.

Throughout this period the applicant and his family received photographs, messages and voice notes in which a baby could be heard crying, together with explanations that the children were with relatives or that the local authority was involved. On his schedule, he paid the respondent about £30,000 over two years towards their care. His mother, who saw the respondent in early August 2024 and was in no doubt that she was pregnant, sent money too.

The respondent’s account changed several times during the proceedings. By the final hearing, her case was that there had never been any children, that both pregnancies and both births had been a series of elaborate lies, and that the photographs had been taken from another woman’s Facebook page. Mrs Justice Judd described both possible explanations as extremely unlikely, the first requiring a detailed deception of an intimate partner sustained for about three years, the second two secret births outside any medical care and two children placed somewhere they had never been traced.

Evidence pointing in both directions

Neither explanation could be dismissed easily, although the evidence on each side was of a different kind. Several features of the case cast doubt on the respondent’s claim that she had invented everything. The judge found it hard to accept that anyone could sustain a deception of such length and detail, particularly with an intimate partner who had seen her unclothed stomach. Photographs showed her with a very rounded stomach during both purported pregnancies, and the applicant and his mother were convinced they had seen her pregnant. Her lies, her obstruction of the court’s enquiries and the deliberately obstructive evidence of her adult daughters added to the sense that something was being hidden.

What none of this provided was independent evidence that a child had been born. Hospital searches, the register of births, the police and the local authority produced no record of either child, and no birth certificate or passport existed for a child the respondent claimed to have taken to Turkey. Expert evidence suggested the ultrasound image was more likely to date from the early 2000s than from 2023, and the photographs said to show the children were confirmed to be of another woman’s children. Her bank statements showed no spending on anything a newborn would need. She was also almost 50 and 51 at the time of the purported births, and it was difficult to see why a mother intent on hiding two children would have publicised them so widely.

Mrs Justice Judd found the applicant and his mother to be truthful and sincere witnesses who fully believed the respondent was pregnant. That finding did not establish the pregnancies. Given the respondent’s deliberate deceit, the ultrasound image she had supplied and her body shape, the judge considered it wholly plausible that they had been convinced of a pregnancy that did not exist. This is an important distinction in family proceedings. A witness may be entirely honest in describing what they saw and believed, yet the court must still consider whether that understanding is supported by the wider evidence. Here it allowed the court to accept the applicant’s sincerity in full without accepting the conclusion he drew from what he had seen.

Why dishonesty did not settle the question

Lying to the court and obstructing its enquiries would normally count heavily against the person responsible, and the judge acknowledged that in many cases the court would draw conclusions from that behaviour. Under a long-established principle derived from R v Lucas, and applied routinely in family proceedings, courts recognise that someone who lies about one thing is not necessarily lying about everything, and that it is necessary to ask why a lie was told and what it actually proves. The respondent’s dishonesty was established whichever account was true. If the children did not exist, she had lied for years to persuade the applicant that they did. Had they existed, she was lying now to conceal them. Her lies could not, by themselves, show which version was correct.

Weighing the evidence as a whole rather than piece by piece, Mrs Justice Judd accepted that no single item was conclusive but found the factors against the children’s existence to be stronger. She concluded, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent had fabricated the pregnancies and the children, and described the deception as cruel, having led a man and his mother to believe they had children and grandchildren. The applicant is seeking permission to appeal.

The wider lesson for family proceedings

Few family law cases will involve circumstances as unusual as those in John v Jane. Disputes built on conflicting accounts, allegations of dishonesty and deeply held beliefs are, however, a regular feature of family proceedings. The judgment reinforces the need to examine all of the available evidence rather than relying on the apparent credibility of one witness or the conduct of another party. Even where someone has been deliberately dishonest, the court must consider what that dishonesty actually establishes and whether the wider evidence supports the findings being sought, and those advising parties need to prepare their cases on that basis from the outset.

There is also a human dimension that should not be lost. The applicant and his mother spent years believing that children and grandchildren existed, only for the court to conclude that they had been subjected to a sustained deception. Cases of this kind call for a thorough and objective assessment of the evidence, but also for an understanding of what the outcome means for the people who have to live with it.

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