If at first you don’t succeed, try and try again. This seems to be Theresa May’s mantra when it comes the Withdrawal Agreement. She and her negotiating team have gone back to Brussels, seeking concessions from the EU on the backstop and repeating previous demands for a legal assurance that it will be time-limited or, at the very least, that the UK can cancel it unilaterally. The EU continues to state that this is not possible as the backstop is an ‘insurance policy’ and must therefore be open-ended until an alternative solution can be implemented.
The second meaningful vote on the Withdrawal Agreement will be held in parliament by 12 March, but will the outcome be any different from the first which was held in January?
Some prominent Brexiteers have hinted that their opposition to the backstop is softening. They continue to demand a time limit but, having previously rejected the entire arrangement out of hand, they are now more sanguine about how this is achieved. Whilst the Prime Minister will be encouraged by this willingness to compromise, it is not clear whether she can persuade enough of her own MPs to back the Withdrawal Agreement. With that in mind and given the scale of defeat on ratifying the deal at the first attempt, the government continues to reach out to Labour MPs who represent constituencies that voted for Brexit, in the hope of getting them on board.
So, what might be the fallout from the second meaningful vote?
Firstly, it appears doubtful that the government can get the deal through at the second attempt. That said, opposition to it does appear that the scale of defeat would be less dramatic on this occasion. This is not necessarily because of any new-found enthusiasm for its terms, but because MPs are more fearful of the possible alternatives. Brexiteers may fall in line rather than risk no Brexit which might follow from a second referendum, whereas Remainers and ‘soft’ Brexit supporters might be inclined to back the Withdrawal Agreement to prevent a no deal outcome. On balance, however, it’s hard to see how enough MPs who previously voted against it can be persuaded to change their minds and reverse the result.
Assuming that the second vote among MPs is lost, we then move to the ‘no deal’ vote designed to gauge support for the UK leaving without a deal. Despite all the talk of ‘no deal being better than a bad deal’, it appears that the only real support for ‘no deal’ is among the minority European Reform Group (ERG) group of Conservative MPs. On that basis, we can safely assume that no deal will be rejected by parliament at that point, although it is important to remember that this remains the ultimate default position if the Withdrawal Agreement is not accepted.
A day later, following this chain of events, MPs will be presented with the option of extending Article 50 for a brief period. Logic would seem to dictate that this will be backed by MPs in the absence of support for either option previously voted on, as to vote against an extension would almost guarantee an unmanaged exit on 29 March.
However, even if parliament votes for an extension of Article 50, the EU must also consent to this and will expect to know why and for how long the UK wants to extend the process. If the Withdrawal Agreement passes on 12 March or is only narrowly defeated thus paving the way for a third decisive vote, then a short delay of month or two is possible in order to pass the necessary legislation.
A heavier defeat of the Withdrawal Agreement would imply a longer delay if the EU remains willing to allow an extension of Article 50, possibly to accommodate a general election or second referendum. The European elections due in May and the question of whether the UK should be expected to participate would then become a further complicating issue.
